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Mental health clinicians engage in an important form of real-
world categorization as they diagnose their patients with 
mental disorder diagnoses. How are clinicians affected by the 
context within which diagnostic criteria of a patient present 
when making diagnostic evaluations? The classification 
system clinicians are instructed to use is structured around a 
statistical approach to assessing diagnosis and does allow for 
the interpretation of criterial features through influences like 
context. The following experiment tests whether clinicians are 
affected by the context within which non-diagnostic 
information about a patient is presented. We tested clinician’s 
diagnostic judgments for symptoms of Conduct Disorder that 
were presented either in a context that should be perceived as 
being associated with Conduct Disorder or in a context that 
should not be perceived as being associated with Conduct 
Disorder. We found that clinicians were influenced by 
context, but in surprising ways. Clinicians lowered their 
diagnostic judgments for symptoms presented in a low 
associative context but did not change their estimates for high 
associative contexts as compared to baseline. The effect of 
context was also found to vary over the criterial symptoms 
that were presented, and this variation was associated with 
clinicians’ idiosyncratic ratings of the criterial symptoms. 
These results have interesting implications for how clinicians 
view their patients and for how context affects categorization 
more generally.  
Keywords: Categorization; clinical reasoning; theory-based 
reasoning. 
Introduction 
Mental health disorders provide an interesting domain 
within which to study real-world categorization. The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) presents a guideline for mental health clinicians to 
use in the categorization of patients into mental disorder 
categories (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). 
Most mental disorders included are described as lists of 
criterial symptoms, with membership in a given category 
being gained by displaying a certain number of the 
described criterial features. For example, in order to qualify 
for a diagnosis of the childhood disorder Conduct Disorder 
a patient must meet a series of required criteria (e.g., 
minimum amount of time showing the problematic 
behaviors, marked impairment in life functioning) and then 
possess any 3 of a possible 15 other criteria that typify 
clinically impairing levels of aggressive behavior and a 
disregard for rules or social norms. The exact symptoms or 
combination of symptoms generally do not figure into 
categorization as long as the required number of symptoms 
is met. 
In order to collect information about the criterial features 
that are present in a given patient, mental health clinicians 
must go through a difficult process of gathering and 
synthesizing different types of information. Patients do not 
necessarily provide their diagnostic symptoms in a clear-cut 
and easy to parse fashion. Instead, such criterial features are 
embedded within a set of extraneous, biographical, non-
diagnostic information. Although the DSM acknowledges 
that the context within which these behaviors occur should 
be taken into account when making diagnostic decisions 
(e.g., a child that frequently gets into fights at school for the 
sake of self-defense likely does not meet criteria for 
Conduct Disorder), such non-diagnostic contextual 
information that does not take the form of actual diagnostic 
criteria does not play a formal, codified role in diagnostic 
classification as delineated in the DSM. The question 
becomes, do clinicians use the context within which 
diagnostic criteria present to make their category decisions?  
Evidence from the cognitive psychology field suggests 
that people’s categorization decisions can be affected by the 
context in which the features are displayed. For example, 
Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner (1993) found that the 
context within which an ambiguous stimulus was presented 
affected the interpretation of its ambiguous features, and 
consequently its categorization. Similarly, Ahn, Novick, and 
Kim (2003) found that providing clinicians with an 
explanatory context for a person’s mental disorder 
symptoms results in the person being categorized as more 
‘normal’. Likewise, the stereotype literature has shown that 
an ambiguous behavior will be categorized differently 
depending on contextual information such as the ethnic 
background of the person engaging in the behavior 
(Gawronski, Geschke, & Banse, 2003). Generally speaking, 
this evidence suggests that people are influenced by the 
context within which categorization information is 
presented. 
The actual structure of DSM categories may further 
influence clinicians to rely on contextual information when 
evaluating patients. The statistical structure used in the 
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DSM to describe mental disorder categories does not closely 
align with what current research has suggested is the 
structure of laypeople’s everyday categories. For example, 
research has shown that people are greatly affected by the 
knowledge they have about relations between features in 
making category decisions (e.g., Ahn, 1998; Murphy & 
Medin, 1995; Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 1998). Recent work 
has expanded these findings to mental health clinicians and 
found that clinicians will endorse causal relations between 
features of a mental disorder. Further, the presence of these 
relations can affect goodness-of-fit judgments for patients 
(Kim & Ahn, 2002). As such, clinicians appear to not 
always abide by the strict categorization proscribed in the 
DSM, and will instead use their own theories in the 
categorization process. This idiosyncratic form of 
categorization allows for the influence of context in 
diagnosing patients.  
The following experiment investigates the influence of 
context on mental health professionals’ judgments of 
hypothetical patients. Specifically, clinician participants 
read vignettes describing youths who have features of 
Conduct Disorder in a context that is associated or not 
associated with a diagnosis of Conduct Disorder. We chose 
Conduct Disorder for our materials because of the large 
number of criterial features (i.e., 15) that can describe the 
disorder category. As such, we can not only investigate the 
general influence of context in making diagnostic decisions, 
but also further investigate whether context differentially 
affects features within a category.  
Methods 
Materials 
In order to test how mental health clinicians are affected by 
the context within which patient symptoms present, we first 
had to create contextual features that could plausibly be 
associated with a mental disorder diagnosis, but did not 
provide actual diagnostic information for the diagnosis. We 
created a set of hypothetical life factors that described 
youths displaying behaviors that would be perceived as 
being associated with a diagnosis of Conduct Disorder 
(High association condition) and youths displaying 
behaviors that would not be perceived as being associated 
with a diagnosis of Conduct Disorder (Low association 
condition). Each life factor was created in a pair that 
matched the basic information of the factor while varying 
whether the factor would be predicted to have a low or high 
association with Conduct Disorder. Figure 1 gives an 
example of such at item. The top box of this figure lists the 
stem that began the life factor description. The two lower 
boxes show the conclusion to this life factor that would 
describe a low or a high association with Conduct Disorder, 
respectively. In this way the Low and High association facts 
were equated in the basic premise and differed in the ending 
of the statement. The High association facts were worded so 
that they did not represent actual features of conduct 
disorder, but rather behaviors/traits that would plausibly 
occur in a child with a Conduct Disorder diagnosis. 
Matched pairs were created to describe three different types 
of life factors: child’s family life, friends, and school 
environment. 
We pretested the materials we created to a group of 
clinical graduate students (N=29) to ensure that the factors 
were associated with Conduct Disorder. We asked the 
pretest participants to “rate the likelihood that each fact 
would be present in a child with Conduct Disorder” on a 0 
(not very likely) to 100 (very likely) scale. In addition, we 
asked the pretest participants to indicate any factors they 
believed were actual criterial, diagnostic symptoms of 
Conduct Disorder or any other mental disorder. Any factor 
that was indicated as being a criterial feature was dropped 
from use. As a first rough pass, we selected for use in 
further experiments feature pairs (as seen in Figure 1) that 
Table 1: Example sets of Low and High association versions of a vignette. 
 
Type of Factor Low Association Version High Association Version 
Family His parents have had a difficult time finding 
him a regular babysitter because his parents 
need a sitter at inconvenient times during the 
day.  
His parents have had a difficult time finding 
him a regular babysitter because people often 
refuse to baby-sit him more than once.  
Friends His friends' parents tend to like him. His friends' parents tend not to like him.  
School 
Environment 
He doesn't like some of his classmates because 
they try to cheat off his tests.  
He doesn't like some of his classmates because 
















Figure 1: An example life factor. 
 
His parents have had a 
difficult time finding him 
a regular babysitter 
because 
… his parents need 
a sitter at 
inconvenient times 
during the day. 
… people often 
refuse to baby-sit 










showed a significant difference in association scores 
between the high and low version as found through 
independent sample t-tests (ps < .05).  
From the basic life factors that we selected through 
Pretest 1, we created vignettes for use in the main 
experiment. Each vignette consisted of one life factor 
randomly selected from each of three types of life factors: 
factors describing the youth’s family, friends, and school 
environment. For each set of three life factors we created a 
High and a Low association vignette. Table 1 shows a Low 
and a High association vignette constructed from the same 
matched pairs of factors. 
We conducted an additional round of pretesting on these 
newly constructed vignettes. We asked clinical interns (i.e., 
students who had already progressed past the initial years of 
graduate or professional training) (N=35) to rate for each 
vignette, “How likely would a child with the given life 
factors be found to have Conduct Disorder if a full clinical 
evaluation was given”, using a scale of a 0 (not very likely) 
to 100 (very likely). From the results of Pretest 2, we 
selected 15 pairs of vignettes that showed a significant 
difference between their High and Low version through 
independent sample t-tests (ps < .01) for use in the actual 
experiment. 
In the main experiment, the presentation of each pretested 
vignette was accompanied by the presentation of one of the 
fifteen features of Conduct Disorder as described in the 
DSM (APA, 2000). These features are as follows: bullies 
others; initiates fights; used a weapon; cruel to people; 
cruel to animals; stolen while confronting a victim; forced 
someone into sexual activity; fire setting; destroyed others' 
property (other than by fire setting); broken into someone 
else's house, building, or car; lies or "cons" others; stolen 
without confronting a victim; stays out at night; run away 
from home overnight; and truant from school. Therefore, in 
the main experiment participants were presented with 
narratives containing four features (3 life factors and one 
criterial conduct disorder feature). The fifteen criterial 
features were rotated through the vignettes such that 
participants read one High and one Low association vignette 
displaying each of the criterial features. The ratings of 
interest in the primary experiment were made from these 
four feature vignettes. 
Procedure 
The primary experiment consisted of two parts: a vignette 
rating phase, and an impression judgment phase. In the 
vignette rating phase, participants rated 30 separate 
vignettes. Fifteen of the vignettes described a High 
association context and 15 described a Low association 
context. For each vignette, participants rated, “How likely 
would a child with the given life factors be found to have 
Conduct Disorder if a full clinical evaluation was given”, 
using a scale of a 0 (not very likely) to 100 (very likely). 
That is, participants made goodness-of-fit judgments for 
each vignette. Each vignette was presented as its own screen 
of the experiment. Participants had to rate a given vignette 
before they could move on to the next vignette. The order of 
the vignettes was randomized for each subject. 
After the vignette phase, participants made two statistical 
and two theory-based judgments of the criterial features that 
had been presented alongside the life factors in the 
vignettes. Specifically, participants rated for each feature the 
statistical prevalence (i.e., the category validity: “what 
percentage of youths diagnosed with Conduct Disorder 
possess that diagnostic feature”) and diagnosticity (i.e., the 
cue validity: “what percentage of youths who display that 
feature meet the criteria for having a diagnosis of Conduct 
Disorder”). The two theory-based judgments asked for 
ratings on the importance to diagnosis (“rate how important 
you believe that feature to be in diagnosing a youth with 
Conduct Disorder”), and the abnormality of that feature 
(“rate how abnormal you believe it is for the average, 
normal youth to possess each of the following criterial 
features of Conduct Disorder”). We also asked participants 
to perform the same likelihood judgments they did for the 
full vignette description on each of the criterial features 
alone (i.e., likelihood that a child with that symptom would 
receive a diagnosis of conduct disorder if a full evaluation 
was given). The order of the five judgments was 
randomized for each subject. 
The experiment was designed as an online survey using 
the Qualtrics survey software. Participants completed the 
experiment at their own pace through their own home or 
office computer. 
Participants 
We recruited professional mental health clinicians who had 
been licensed for at least 5 years and had experience in the 
treatment of children (N=22) to participate in the main 
experiment. We contacted clinicians by posting 
advertisements through mailing lists of professional 
organizations that cater to clinicians specializing in the care 
of youth patients. Participants were entered into a drawing 
for a chance of winning a $50 online gift certificate as 
compensation. In addition, a $5 donation was made in each 
participant’s name to a charity that focuses on child welfare 
issues. 
Results 
Overall Effects of Context 
From a strictly DSM perspective, clinicians should not rate 
vignettes in the High and Low conditions differently. That 
is, since the vignettes were equated on the number of 
presented criterial features, then clinicians should rate all of 
the vignettes the same. However, if the context within which 
these diagnostic features appears affects categorization, then 
a difference should be found between the two conditions. 
This latter prediction was supported in our data. Figure 2 
depicts the likelihood scores averaged across the 15 High 
context vignettes (M=54.8) in the far left bar and the scores 
averaged across the 15 Low context vignettes (M=29.2) in 
the far right bar.  The likelihood ratings for the High and 
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Low conditions were significantly different, F(1,21) = 54.0, 
p < .001. 
We further analyzed the High and Low conditions to 
determine how the likelihood evaluations of criterial 
features are affected by contextual factors when the features 
are presented in the vignettes as compared to the 
presentation of those features without context, as measured 
in the baseline likelihood measures. The middle bar of 
Figure 2 shows the average baseline likelihood judgment for 
the criterial features. A repeated measures ANOVA with 
judgment type (High, Low, vs. Baseline) as a factor found a 
significant main effect of judgment type, F(2, 42) = 25.3, p 
< .001. Specific paired t-tests were completed to investigate 
the source of this main effect. The baseline judgment 
(M=54.0) was significantly higher than the Low condition, 
t(21) = 6.40,  p < .001. However, there was not a significant 
difference between the baseline judgment and the High 
condition, p = .86. In short, couching a criterial feature in a 
context that has a low association with Conduct Disorder 
reduces likelihood judgments compared to judgments for 
that feature alone; couching a criterial feature in a high 
association context does not create a change over baseline.  
Feature Specific Effects of Context 
The preceding analyses collapsed ratings across all of the 
presented criterial features to look at the general effect of 
context. Using such an analysis washes out any individual 
differences that may exist between criterial features in their 
resilience to the effect of context. Looking at the criterial 
features listed in the Methods section, the nature of the 
features used as criteria for Conduct Disorder vary greatly in 
their severity and underlying character. For example, both 
stays out at night and has forced someone into sexual 
activity are features of Conduct Disorder that are meant to 
be given equal weight in diagnosis. Is it possible that 
features that vary so greatly in their composition and 
apparent severity are weighted equally by clinicians and 
therefore treated equally in our likelihood judgments? Our 
question of interest is whether these inherent differences in 
the nature of criterial features result in differing influences 
of context. 
The first step in evaluating the effect of context on 
individual features was to create a score that could measure 
this influence. We calculated a context effect score for each 
participant’s criterial feature ratings by subtracting their 
rating for the Low condition from their rating in the High 
condition for each criterial feature. A large context effect 
score would thus be found when context causes great shifts 
in ratings between the High and Low conditions, whereas 
small context effect scores would be found for features 
whose likelihood estimates do not change across conditions. 
To determine if these context effect scores differed across 
features, we rank ordered the 15 criterial features for each 
participant according to their context effect scores. We then 
averaged the context effect scores at each rank across 
participants. For example, we calculated the average context 
effect score across all participants for Rank 1, regardless of 
what feature it was, Rank 2, and so on. By doing this, we 
can compare across participants how their context effect 
scores varied, while ignoring what specific features were 
paired with high and low context presentations. For ease of 
comparison, we collapsed these rankings into the top five 
ranked scores, the middle five ranked scores, and the bottom 
five ranked scores. Figure 3 shows the average context 
effect scores for the top five (M=45.2), the middle five 
(M=26.4), and the bottom five (M=5.17) as separate bars. A 
repeated measures ANOVA over rank (top five, middle five, 
vs. bottom five) found a significant main effect, F(2, 42) = 
102.5, p < .001). Paired t-tests were conducted between the 
three groups and significant differences (using Bonferroni 
corrected alpha levels) were found for all comparisons: top 
vs. middle: t(21) = 9.20, p < .001; top vs. bottom: t(21) = 
11.5, p < .001; middle vs. bottom: t(21) = 7.93, p < .001). 
These differences indicate that individual criterial features 
of Conduct Disorder vary greatly in how they are influenced 
by context.   
 
Figure 2: Average likelihood ratings for baseline 





Figure 3: Context effect scores grouped by rank order. 
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One possible interpretation of Figure 3 is that individual 
features of Conduct Disorder may be influenced differently 
by context.  That is, is there agreement among clinicians as 
to which features of Conduct Disorder are inherently more 
influenced or interpretable by the context within which they 
present? To answer this question, we assessed the level of 
agreement across participants in context scores for 
individual features. Participants’ context effect scores were 
subjected to a Kendall’s W Test to assess overall agreement 
between participants in ratings for individual features. Very 
low agreement was found, Kendall’s W = .038, p = .62. This 
finding suggests that differences in context effect scores 
across features are not stable across participants. Instead, 
individual participants differ in what features are influenced 
in their judgments by context. In short, the effects of context 
are dependent on the clinician who is rating the feature as 
opposed to being a trait inherent to the criterial feature. 
Our analysis so far has suggested that the effect of context 
differs across features in a way that is dependent on the 
clinician who is doing the rating. To investigate what factors 
may be influencing how clinicians are influenced by context 
for some features and not for others, we can compare each 
participant’s context effect scores to the same participant’s 
impression judgments (statistical and theory-based property 
ratings) we collected at the end of the experiment.1 For each 
participant we calculated the correlation between the context 
effect score and the rating they provided for each criterial 
feature on each of the four dimensions. (Two subjects were 
dropped from these analyses because there was no variation 
in their judgments, preventing correlations from being 
calculated.) Averaging across participants, we found 
negative correlations between context effect scores and 
Importance (M = -.11) and Abnormality (M = -.13). These 
negative correlations reflect that the more abnormal or 
important to diagnosis a feature was rated, the less 
likelihood ratings differed for that feature across the High 
and Low contexts (i.e., the lower the context effect scores). 
Very small correlations were found between Prevalence 
(M=.04) and Diagnosticity (M=.01) and the context effect 
scores. To test the significance of these correlations, we 
used one-sample t tests to compare the correlations across 
participants to a value of zero, thereby testing if the 
correlations were significantly different from zero. The 
theory-based measures showed a relation to the context 
effect scores. Importance showed a correlation with context 
score that was significantly different from zero, t(19) = 2.64, 
p = .016. Abnormality approached a significant correlation, 
p = .056. The statistical measures of Prevalence and 
Diagnosticity were not significantly different from zero, ps 
> .5. 
                                                 
1 Kendall W was also calculated for the statistical and theory-
based judgments. Prevalence (W=.514), Importance (W=.210), and 
Abnormality (W=.465) all showed significant agreement, all ps < 
.001. There was not significant agreement in the Diagnosticity 
scores, W=.062, p = .16.  
Discussion 
The goal of the described experiment was to evaluate if 
clinicians are influenced by non-diagnostic context factors 
in assessing criterial features of mental disorder categories. 
In our experiment we equated the number of criterial 
diagnostic features and varied only the non-diagnostic 
features in descriptions of hypothetical youths. According to 
standardized diagnostic manuals used in the mental health 
field (APA, 2000), our vignettes should be equally likely to 
receive a Conduct Disorder diagnosis regardless of 
condition since they present only one criterial feature of 
Conduct Disorder and not the three needed for a diagnosis 
(no matter if the non-diagnostic features have a high or low 
perceived association with Conduct Disorder). Despite this 
proscription, we found that clinicians rate hypothetical 
youths that display non-diagnostic features that have a 
perceived high association with Conduct Disorder as more 
likely to receive a Conduct Disorder diagnosis than youths 
who display non-diagnostic features that have a perceived 
low association with Conduct Disorder. Interestingly, 
context appears to have an asymmetric effect across our 
High and Low association conditions. Specifically, the Low 
association condition resulted in a significant depression in 
likelihood ratings compared to baseline. However, the High 
association condition did not show any difference from 
baseline.  
The finding that context had different effects in the High 
and Low association conditions is intriguing for many 
reasons. From a cognitive perspective, context would be 
expected to have symmetrical effects.  That is, if a low 
context can reduce ratings, then a high context should 
increase ratings. Why did we not find such an increase in 
our experiment? From a mental health diagnosis point of 
view, one could speculate the opposite finding than what 
was shown in our results. Specifically, clinicians are 
instructed that a mental disorder diagnosis should not be 
provided if the diagnostic symptoms a patient displays are a 
normal reaction to life events (APA, 2000). With this idea in 
mind, the High association condition should provide a 
possible explanation for why the criterial feature is being 
displayed (see also, Ahn, Novick, & Kim, 2003). For 
example, perhaps having the life factors displayed in the 
High association condition of Table 1 would be enough 
reason or serve as a good explanation for why a youth 
would show a problematic behavior that is diagnostic for 
Conduct Disorder. Along this logic, the youth in the Low 
association condition looks particularly surprising. Why 
would a youth who is coming from a normal, non-
problematic background as depicted in the Low association 
condition of Table 1 then show a behavior that is diagnostic 
of Conduct Disorder? With this logic, the Low association 
condition could in fact look more abnormal and receive a 
higher likelihood rating than the High association condition. 
It is an interesting direction for future research to determine 
why the High association context does not change from 
baseline but the Low association context does. Researching 
1957
this question can help illuminate how context affects 
categorization more generally. 
In addition to the general finding of context influencing 
ratings overall, our results show that individual criterial 
features were differently affected by context. This differing 
effect of context for each participant was correlated with 
that individual’s theory-based ratings for the criterial 
features as opposed to statistical judgments. Specifically, 
individual features that were impervious to the effect of 
context (i.e., showed the same likelihood ratings in the High 
and Low conditions) were given high ratings on their 
importance to the diagnosis process. Statistical measures, 
such as prevalence and diagnosticity, did not correlate with 
the effect of context in our ratings.  
Were the measures we took the best predictors of the 
context effect scores? While the correlation between 
Importance and context effect scores was significant, it was 
not an overwhelmingly strong correlation. What other 
measures might better predict which features of a mental 
disorder are impervious to context and which features are 
not? For example, recent research has found that a 
clinician’s emotional response to a patient can predict the 
therapy outcome for that patient (Marci, Ham, Moran, & 
Orr, 2007). Perhaps the emotional response a clinician has 
when reading about a problematic behavior can predict how 
much the context that feature is presented in will affect its 
interpretation.  For instance, learning that a patient is cruel 
to animals may result in enough of a negative emotional 
response that the surrounding contextual features do not 
have the opportunity to influence diagnostic evaluations. 
This is a rich avenue for future research. 
Summary 
Mental health disorders are a unique form of category in 
that the structure and classification criteria for the category 
are explicitly laid out for the categorizer. Mental health 
clinicians must discover these explicit criteria from their 
patients amidst a large amount of non-diagnostic 
information that may or may not be useful for their 
diagnostic decision-making. Despite the explicit structure 
prescribed for categorization, we found that mental health 
clinicians are influenced by the context within which 
diagnostic symptoms are presented in unique and 
idiosyncratic ways. Future research should focus on 
discovering the true nature of how these individual 
differences in the assessment of diagnostic criteria come 
about. Such research will shed light on the clinical 
diagnostic process as well as categorization more generally. 
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